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The Arab Center for Independence of the
Judiciary and the Legal Profession (ACIJLP)
Cairo, on June 30
2009
The
Justice Report
(The government and the judges ... the eight years attack)
Report Summery:
The report of the
Arab Center for Independence of the judiciary and the legal profession,
"the government and judges in Egypt ... the eight-year oppression", a
reading for the attempts of the executive authority to have a control
over the judiciary and judges in Egypt and the resulted serious
violations for the independence of the judiciary as well as the abuse of
judicial institutions.
The report states the
legislative texts governing the work of judges and the judiciary in
Egypt, the extent to which these texts are compatible with the
recognized and applicable international standards, and whether they
ensure adequate safeguards for judicial independence. The report also
indicates some of the physical procedures which violated the
independence of judges in Egypt from 2000-2008, referring to their
variant sources. The report, in the last section, includes an analytical
reading for the main reasons behind these violations.
The Center considered
it might be useful to read the events - relevant ones- that happened
during the period covered by the report, as well as the legislations
that affected the status of justice, the judiciary and the work of the
judges, as an attempt to inform human rights activists, judges, the
legislature, and decision makers with the sources and practices that
negatively influence the status of justice and citizen rights making the
Egyptian government seems to violate its international obligations.
The aim of monitoring
the violations against the independence of the judiciary - by different
sources - is to remedy the situation, whether by the necessary amendment
for the legislation or to stop and criminalize the violating practices
and actions and prosecute the perpetrator. The report concluded the
following:
1. Executive control over the affairs of the judiciary and judges.
Unprecedentedly, the
hegemony and interventions of the executive authority, represented by
the Minister of Justice, in the legal competences have continued, as
well as the breach of many of the safeguards guaranteeing the
independence of the judiciary. Within the period defined in the report,
there were interventions in the judicial proceedings, the abuse of the
judge’s rights of security, physical safety, freedom of opinion and
expression, freedom of association as well as the violation of their
right to provide guarantees of a fair and just trial.
Overall, the ordinary
judicial bodies, represented in the Constitutional Court, the State
Council and the ordinary courts, were subject to many interventions that
formed a violation for the independence of the judiciary causing the
abuse of the public rights and freedoms of citizens, which had a very
bad impact on the judges themselves, the justice facility and the rights
and freedoms of citizens.
2. Exclusion of ordinary judiciary and referring people to
exceptional judiciary
- Jurisdiction was
withdrawn from the ordinary judiciary and given to the exceptional
courts; whether the military tribunals or state security courts that
have an exceptional mechanism. The executive authority continued to
prosecute civilians before these exceptional courts, the year 2008
witnessed the decision of the President of the Republic No. 160 of 2008
in May 25, 2008 to extend the state of emergency proclaimed by the
provisional decision of President of the Republic No. 560 of 1981, for
two years starting from the beginning of June 2008 until May 31, 2010 or
for a term expiring with the enactment of anti-terrorism legislation.
Thus, the Act No. 162 of 1958 is applicable including the emergency law
that would give the opportunity to continue the violations for the
jurisdictions of the judiciary and to judicialize the non-judicial
bodies to have a control over the jurisdictions. As well as violation
for the right to be prosecuted before ordinary court the breach of the
guarantees of fair and just trial.
- One of the latest
cases in the year 2008 was Al-Mahala actions, known in the media as "6
April strike", which was ruled by the State Security Emergency Court,
and recorded under No. 89 of 2008. The court issued the decision No.
5498 of 2008, criminal cases of Al-Mahal, on December 15, 2008.
The year 2008
witnessed
the rule of the Supreme Military Tribunal in Case No. 2 of 2007,
military crimes, on 15/4/2008 on 40 leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood,
which reflects the continuation of the Egyptian government to refer the
trial of civilians to military courts that do not secure the minimum
guarantees of a fair and just trial for civilians in a clear non-committment
for the provisions of the Egyptian Constitution, especially Article 68
thereof, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which Egypt ratified in January 14, 1982 and published in the Official
Gazette on April 15 of the same year. The Cairo Criminal Court had
issued its ruling to release of the accused people but it was not
implemented, also the Attorney General issued a decision to confiscate
the properties of the accused people and prevent their wives and
children weather adults or minors to dispose any of them.
On February 5, 2007 the President of the Republic issued a decision to
refer the case to the military justice, and it was heard before the
military court. The referred hearing is the third one of the sentencing
hearings in the case which had already been postponed twice in a row,
the first one in February 26, 2008, which postponed to March 25, 2008,
and then postponed until Tuesday, April 15, in which 25 of the accused
people were sentenced to jail ranging from three to ten years, while 15
were acquitted.
3- Tampering with the Egyptian Constitution, disrespecting the
guarantees of the public freedoms and rights, and constitutionalizing
the exceptional judiciary.
Attempts to tamper
with the Egyptian Constitution were successful. There were also attempts
to undermine the relevant provisions of the public rights and freedoms
in addition to the exclusion of judges to supervise and monitor the
parliamentary and presidential elections. About 35 out of 211 articles
of the Constitution were amended in the year 2005. The most serious of
these amendments were the amendment to article 76 of the Constitution in
terms of form, language and prerequisites of the presidential election
candidacy, as it is notable that there is a higher percentage of
required advocacy to the candidacy, under the control of one party to
all councils (people’s assembly - Shura council- local councils). This
will make the candidate unable to reach the required proportion of
votes. Second: the amendment to the article (76) of the Constitution,
the longest article of the Constitutions of the world, that includes
detailed constitutional provisions and legal texts and regulations ,
this amendment was not drafted according to the rules of the
constitutional drafting in general and the Egyptian one in particular,
so that a great concerns were raised towards the reasons behind these
amendments.
The year 2007
witnessed the amendment of 34 articles of the Constitution, including
the amendment of Article 88 on judicial oversight of elections, where
the amendment reduced the competences of the judicial oversight of
elections and made them useless.
In addition, the
amendment of the article 179 on anti-terrorism, it is the first time
that the constitutional legislature gives the legal legislature a
license to violate the constitutional provisions concerning the rights
and freedoms, allows to approach the relevant judicial guarantees of
personal liberties: to search, arrest and imprison individuals and
restrict their freedom of movement without judicial authorization or
judicial investigation, violate the sanctity of the home through
entering and searching without judicial authorization, also the
possibility of interception and monitoring of postal correspondence and
telephone talks without judicial authorization. This imposes more risks
on the rights and freedoms of citizens, and restricts and guarantees of
judicial protection and control of those rights.
The amendment of Article 179 of the Constitution also allowed the
President of the Republic to take away the jurisdiction from ordinary
justice and to be able, in accordance with a constitutional provision,
to refer those accused of terrorism to any judicial body, including
military tribunals and the courts of exceptional emergency. Before these
judicial bodies, the civilians would not enjoy the guarantees of a fair
and just trial.
4- Reduce and restrict the role of the Constitutional Court in the
protection of public rights and freedoms, through the insistence of the
executive authority not to appoint the heads of the court from the
general assembly.
- After the Supreme
Court played a leading role in the protection of public rights and
freedoms in Egypt including the establishment of the principles of
constitutional legitimacy and its distinct and creative and innovative
role to stand against the wave of anti-constitutional laws ...... in the
area of public rights and freedoms and the invalidity of the formation
and composition of the People’s assembly four times in a row due to the
amendments of the legislation of political rights exercise which
represented a violation for the legitimacy and the public rights and
freedoms. As well as in the areas of the legislative exaggeration while
enacting tax laws as the Supreme Constitutional Court considered many
of tax laws, approximately 19, as unconstitutional. Consequently, the
Supreme Constitutional Court faced several campaigns aiming at reducing
of its role. The reporting period has seen a marked decline of the role
of the Constitutional Court in the protection of the rights and
freedoms, there are many of the issues that are facing, what could be
called "freezing" as there is a delay to finalize them, particularly
issues related to rights and freedoms.
• The report considers the reason is the insistence of the executive
authority not to appoint the President of the Court of from the members
of its General Assembly. The President of the Supreme Constitutional
Court shall, according to the traditional constitution, be appointed
from the senior members, but the President of the Republic issued a
resolution No. 290 of the year 2001 to appoint the President, Chancellor
Dr. Fathi Naguib, director of legislation department, Ministry of
Justice, from outside the general assembly and thus from outside its
members, and the Chancellor Mamdouh Mohieddin Marei, president of Cairo
Court of Appeal in 26/8/2003, and the Chancellor Maher Abdel-Wahid as
president of the Supreme Constitutional Court in 2006.
• The reason for this decline may be the continued criticism directed
for the court in the form of repeated campaigns – from which the
Constitutional Court had suffered – launched by some members of the
People’s Assembly, out of their own will or inciting them to make the
court under the disposal of the People's Assembly (when a member of the
People's Assembly representing the Democratic National Party submitted a
proposal in November 1997 to the speaker of the People's Assembly to
amend Article 49 of the Code of the Supreme Constitutional Court
claiming that the rules of the court that made any legal text
unconstitutional have to be considered by People’s Assembly for the sake
of what he called the constitutional harmonization). The executive
authority ignored all of the abovementioned point when the President of
Republic issued the Act No. 168 of 1998 cancelling the retroactive
effect of the judgments of the Constitutional Court in relation to the
constitutionality of a tax legal text, except if the plaintiff would
benefit from declaring that the text is unconstitutional.
5- Criticizing and disrespecting the judicial rulings and using the
legal stratagems to obstruct and prevent the implementation of such
rulings.
For the first time
since the establishment of the administrative judiciary in Egypt, the
Council of State invaded its independence, and reduced its role to
protect the public rights and freedoms, where the reporting period has
seen high rates of non-implemented judicial decisions by the executive
authority, to the extent of being a phenomenon. Whereas the
Administrative Court issued 14 ruling in favor of Al-Shaab newspaper,
however, the government insisting on refusing the implementation in
addition to non-implementation of the provisions for the benefit of
hundreds of political prisoners who got acquitted by the State Security
Courts; along with the non-implementation of the judgments of the
administrative courts regarding the appeals submitted on the elections
in 2000 and the judgments issued in 2005, as the Ministry of Interior
refused to implement such judgments to the extent that there are 6 free
seats in the people’s Assembly because of the non- implementation of
judicial judgments on conducting the elections in 6 constituencies.
The Center monitored some cases including the refusal of the Egyptian
Ministry of Interior to implement the final judgments of the courts in
the interest of students in the Institute of the Police, for example
judgment dated on 29/1/2006 in case No. 44349 of 1959 filed by Taher
Mohammed Mohammed against the Minister of the Interior in his capacity,
the judgment dated on 26/3/2006 in Case No. 30477 of the year 1959 filed
by Abdullah Abdul-Karim Salim against the Minister of Interior in his
capacity, the judgment dated on 25/6/2006 in case No. 4047 of 1960
filed by Mohamed Abdul Aziz Abdul Wahab against the Minister of the
Interior in his capacity, and the judgment dated on 29/5/2005 in Case
No. 18032 of the year 1959 filed by Sharif Mustafa Ahmed Aboul Atta
against the Minister of Interior in his capacity, and the judgment dated
on 29/5/2005 in case No. 16988 of 1959 filed by Awady Khedrgy
abdul-karem against the Minister of Interior in his capacity.
Unprecedentedly, the
Egyptian government was exclusively described as the honorable litigant
in the administrative hearings, such term was used by individuals’
lawyers referring to the government over the past 50 years. The
executive authority resorted to the obstruction and non-implementation
of judicial decisions issued by the Council of State using legal tricks
directly through the Authority of the State Cases, or indirectly through
filling appeal before non-competent courts leading to the widespread
disrespect for the court rulings and the refusal of implementation by
the Egyptian government. That led to shaken public confidence in the
usefulness of resorting to the administrative judiciary in Egypt.
6- The judges' profanation of the judicial provision
Violating the
judicial norms and traditions, the declared profanation of the judgments
passed by the State Council has been enlarged; the seriousness of such
matter is embedded in the insults of the provisions issued by the
Egyptian Administrative Court by some judges affiliate to the Egyptian
Judiciary System which contributed to expanding the phenomenon of
showing objection over the judicial provisions illegally and without
consulting experts. This was crystal clear through the attitude of some
judges of the Egyptian courts of Appeal toward the judgment of the
Administrative Court issued on 4/12/2008 in relation to the Heads of
Appeal Council and the attack launched by the members of this council
against the judgment. The Head of the council declared in a formal
statement that he does not recognize such judgment, and the statement
issued by this council described judgment as "invalid". There are also
the declarations of the head of the Supreme Judicial Council – in a
meeting with the members of the a regional association – in relation to
the judgment passed by the Administrative Court to confine
investigations on the small families of the candidate to the Public
Prosecution describing the judgment as "passed by a non-authorized
person".
7- Canceling the function of the State Council to mitigate his role of
protecting rights and freedoms
8- The severe intervention of the Minister of Justice through
exceptional formation and interpolating public figures whom he chooses
while forming the first department of the Supreme Administrative Court
·
The court
entitled as The Court of Parties – which reviews the resolutions of the
Parties' Affairs Committee - violates the independence of the State
Council as the legislator decided to form this court in the first
department of the Supreme Administrative Court headed by the State
Council President. A number of public figures, designated by the
Minister of Justice after the approval of The Supreme Council of the
judicial bodies, will participate in forming such court. Such formation
will be an odd one due to the interpolation of people other than the
judges in such process. The report concludes that the continuation of
the existence of this court with its odd and exceptional formation is
considered a violation for the independence of the judicial power in
general because it overlooks the judicial supervision and the right of
litigation under Articles 68, 165, and 166 of the constitution, it also
violated the independence of the State Council which is confirmed to be
an independent judicial agency under Article 172 of the constitution.
Third: The
Ordinary judiciary
9- Overlooking the function of the ordinary judiciary and devoting the
military and exceptional role of the judiciary
·
The normal
judgment encounters interventions with imposes negative impacts on its
independence and its role of protecting rights and freedoms. Such
interventions are represented by the continuation enforcing the
emergency law for along time since 1981, the expansion of ripping
certain cases off of the ordinary judiciary and referring it to the
state security courts or the military courts, the executive authority
trial to impose the nature of the ordinary judiciary on the military
courts, and legislating the referral of the civilians to the military
courts. One evidence is the establishment of the military court of
cassation under law No. 16 for the year 2007 pertaining to the amendment
of the provisions of the military provisions law No. 25 for the year
1966. This led to the existence of two supreme bodies concerned with
unifying and interpreting law and distancing the judges of the cassation
court reviewing the appeals of the military judgments, the executive
authority trial to make the policemen join the Public Prosecution as an
introduction for joining the judiciary with their pre-readiness to
refuse being away from the executive authority and the continuation of
doing that despite the difference between the judicial work and the
police work.
10- The Continuous Control of the Minister of Justice over the Estimates
of the Judicial Power and Judges
-
In a serious
indication of violating the judicial power independence, the power
of the Minister of Justice to control the judges' estimates in Egypt
has been expanded that he called upon the judges to authorize him
for gaining their independence and getting back their dues from the
executive authority on Monday, 16th of March 2009, in
Tanta Courts Compound.
-
Such power depends
on Article 9 of the judicial power law No. 46 for the year 2006
which grants the Minister of Justice one of the most serious powers
to control the courts of first instances. Such power is the
Minister's function of authorizing the head of each the court of
first instance without the intervention of the general assembly of
the court to which the designated justice belongs, and that the
viewpoint of the Supreme Judicial Council regarding this resolution
is a consultative opinion. Moreover, the authorization is for one
year which can be renewed depending on the Minister's desire which
imposes pressure on the job occupant. Article 36 of the mentioned
law allows the minister of justice to take away the judicial
administration from the courts and giving it to the minister of
justice to do whatever he wants. The mentioned Article enables the
Minister of Justice to interfere in organizing and forming the
judicial departments, distributing the cases to the different
departments, and the other matters in relation to the courts systems
and their internal affairs. In addition, Articles 45, 78,79 and 121
provide that the Department of Judicial Inspection of courts and the
Department of the Judicial Inspection of the General Prosecution are
formed in the Ministry of Justice as bodies relate to the ministry.
Furthermore, it is known that the Inspection Department is the
department which follows up the judicial work and the prosecutors
and submit reports them which influences the magistrates and
prosecutors and gives the Ministry of Justice more power than that
of the judicial power members. There are more issues to be discussed
later in details.
11- The Executive authority violates the basis of the Egyptian Judicial
System enforced since 1882 through establishing judicial
non-constitutional or non-legal Entities.
·
Violating the judicial norms and traditions, the executive authority
ignores the basis of the Egyptian Judicial System and tried to establish
entities not based on constitution or law like (The Appeals Council)
which is one of the bodies established by the Minister of Justice to
launch an attack against the Judges Association and the judges calling
for independence. The administrative Court passed a judgment on
4/12/2008 that no law has been passed concerning this council and it is
not provided in the executive authority law. In consequence, whether to
establish it or not it is the same.
·
The report period witnessed inappropriate intervention in the judicial
procedures, for example, the resolution issued by The Appeals Council
for the heads of departments in courts to supervise the member judges of
departments, write reports about them, and establish a department for
the judges' complaints which will enable the executive authority to
follow up the judges administratively and judicially.
·
The report period also witnessed a trial to undermine the role of the
Egyptian Court of Cassation through the irrelevant proposal which was
ignored to avoid triggering anger amongst judges. The proposal was to
establish cassation departments within the Courts of Appeal in order to
dismiss the judges of the Courts of Cassation and distance them from
viewing certain issues especially after the Court of Cassation have
shown through a number of judgments that it enjoys a great deal of
independence and that it judges many judgments not approved by the
Egyptian government.
·
The trial of the Minister of Justice to pass the draft law entitled as
"The Judicial bodies Council" to impose fully the executive authority
control over the judicial system, undermine the judicial immunity of
judges, and to be a kind of re-establishment of the Supreme Judicial
Council. In addition, the trial to cancel the authority of the Socialist
Public Prosecutor and referring his power to the Illicit Gain Department
instead of referring such functions to the Public Prosecution. There is
also the trial of passing the Judges' Academy Project in order to impose
the control of the executive authority legally over the matter of
appointing judges. Even when the economic courts have been established,
which was a positive form of the judges' specialization, the control of
the executive authority represented by the Minister of Justice was full
regarding determining the spatial function of each court and the choice
of its judges.
12- The approach of the current Egyptian Minister of Judge to ridicule,
offend, and defame the judges in his declarations
·
Showing the collapse of the public trust in judges, the report period
have witnessed the worst unprecedented campaign of offense and
defamation on a large, organized scale. The judges and their
independence were defamed and accused through the governmental media,
some judicial bodies, and the Judge Mamdoh Marey, the current Minister
of Justice. In addition to the Minister of Justice declaration that a
large number of judges and head of courts are inefficient, he ridiculed
and offended the magistrates, for example, he ridiculed the head a great
judicial association describing him with unpardonable treats.
·
The report period also witnessed the declarations of the head of the
Supreme Judicial Council in his attack against the members of the Judges
Association Board especially those calling for the independence of the
Egyptian Judiciary System.
Fourth: The Judges
Association
13- Unprecedented activity for the Judges Association led to aggressive
governmental actions against the Egyptian Judges Association and reached
an assault on judges ignoring their physical safety rights.
·
The report period witnessed Unprecedented activity for the Judges
Association as it did not submit to what was planned by the Ministry of
Justice to make it just a social association. On the contrary, it highly
exceeded such level as it demonstrated influential activity regarding
the call for the judicial system independence within the period defined
in the report in addition to promoting the judges freedom of opinion and
encouraging the practice of this right in accordance with the judicial
traditions and what is provided by the ad hoc international treaties.
·
The role of the Judges Association was prominent within the period
defined in the report in calling for amending the judicial power law in
a way which ensures an effective and real independence for judges which
in turn will promote the justice conditions. Such role was also clear in
calling for the amendment of laws relate to the practice of the
political rights especially those pertaining to ensuring real judicial
supervision on the elections and the mitigation of forgery of votes.
14- The Ministry of Justice tries to minimize the Judges Association
role by imposing financial restrictions on the Egyptian Judges
Association and the regional associations incorporated within it
The report period
witnessed unprecedented violation for the judges' freedom of opinion and
expression represented by the trial of the Ministry of Justice do
dismantle the Egyptian Judges Association Board, outlaw the viewpoint of
the General Assembly of the Egyptian Judges Association, transform the
Judges Association to a social association, which is not concerned with
the judges independence and their interests, through imposing financial
restrictions on the judges associations. Such procedure was a logical
consequence of the lack of the executive authority financial
independence and its control over the judges estimates as in this way
the executive authority has the power to give or not. This led the
Judges Association to suffer from sharp financial crisis in the heel of
the suspension of the financial assistance estimated by 60 million
pounds annually, provided to the Egyptian Judges Association and the
other regional associations, by the Ministry of Justice. The Judges
Association also refused to receive ant financial assistance from the
Health & Social Care Fund and from courts.
·
Such procedure is considered an unprecedented financial disaster which
led such associations not to afford paying the money required for paying
salaries and getting the daily needs. It also led to the disruption of
supply of water and electricity in the judges associations for not
affording paying the bills. Moreover, the cell phones company which the
Judges Association contracts threatened to suspend the service
pertaining to the magistrates and prosecutors' SIM cards which are about
10.000 for not paying the annual amount estimated by 4 million pounds.
·
Such full financial restrictions were not sufficient for the ministry;
therefore, it cancelled the governmental employees' authorization to
work at the association. The Ministry of Justice resolution which was
issued in the mid-year of 2007 provides the cancellation of the
authorization of the Ministry of Justice employees and those authorized
to work for he Judges Association, a resolution which seems to be an
integral part of the plan to terminate any role foe the Judges
Association and to view it as a social association using various
mechanisms to be mentioned in details within the report.
15- Using media to attack the members of the Judges Association Board
and threaten the judges to be pursued judicially and administratively by
the Supreme Judicial Council in order to prevent their freedom of
opinion and expression
·
The Judges Association activity led to a large number of aggressive
actions on the part of the executive authority especially after holding
many meetings which rejected the participation in supervising elections
without legislative insurance which mitigates the large scale forgery.
In doing this, the executive authority used the governmental media
especially "Rozal Youssef" newspaper to launch a large campaign to
accuse the judges of political work when the judges sought to practice
their freedom of opinion and expression to negate the accusations
directed to them, to express their viewpoint regarding the forgery of
2005 elections, and to call for financial and administrative
independence form the Ministry of Justice.
·
The Supreme Judicial Council also threatened the judges especially the
members of the Judges Association Board within the period defined in the
report to pursue them judicially and administratively while practicing
their freedom of opinion and expression through media.
16- Ignoring judges and their immunity to the extent of increasing the
assaults on them
-
In a precedent
that was never witnessed all through the Egyptian judicial history,
the rate of judges personal and physical safety outlaw dramatically
increased and the rate of the assaults on them by policemen,
lawyers, and even by citizens in courts especially during the
judges' supervision on the parliamentary elections – particularly
after the assault on the Judge and the Former Head of the State
Council Mr. El Sanhory in 1954 – and in consequence of the
governmental campaign launched against The Egyptian Judges
Association. The elections was not the sole occasion where the
judges were assaulted; the assault and insult of two judges who are
heads of courts by 3 policemen in Luxor Airport on 23/9/2008
enhances such viewpoint.
17- The outlaw of the judges rights under a just trial
The report was based on
what was witnessed in 2006 after the referral of two judges to a
disciplinary council as being accused of defaming the Egyptian Judiciary
System by their declarations around the results or the 2005
parliamentary elections, the matter which is considered a great
violation for the independence of the Egyptian Judiciary System. The
rates of judicial pursuing of judges who are deputy heads of the
Egyptian Court of Cassation increased in relation to investigating them
before a judge or the Supreme Judicial Council and it became a pattern
adopted by the Egyptian Supreme Judicial Council. By the beginning of
the year especially during February 2006, the number of deputy heads of
the Egyptian Court of Cassation has reached 7: Mr. Ahmed Mekky, Mr.
Mahmoud Mekky, Mr. Mahmoud El Khodery, Mr. Hesham Bastawisy, Mr. Assem
Abdulgabbar, Mr. Yehia Galal, and Mr. Nagy Derbala.
The Recommendations
In order to guarantee
the real and effective independence of the judiciary and to protect the
guarantees which ensure the independence of judges, the following report
sets out some recommendations, which the center views as the minimum
standards of ensuring the independence of judiciary system and the
judges as recognized and applicable on a large scale, in the following
way:
-
Reviewing the
constitutional provisions pertaining to the rights and freedoms, and
the requirement of the amendment of Articles 76, 77, 88, 179
regarding the form to preserve the dignity of the constitutional
provisions and the content to ensure and preserve rights and
personal freedoms.
-
Purifying the
Egyptian constitution from the provisions which gives the courts the
nature of the judicial bodies and allows the prosecution of the
civilians before military courts, in addition to providing that the
judicial power should control all the matters of judicial nature and
that it should be terminate any matter within its function.
1-
To enlarge the controls
which guarantee the independence of the judiciary and to transfer the
power of the minister of justice to the Supreme Judicial Council
including the supervision on all the courts and judges and their work
and control over the judges affairs like the appointments, disciplines,
training, and other matters subject to the supervision of the Ministry
of Justice.
2-
Electing the members of the
Supreme Judicial Council among the judges and the non-intervention of
the executive authority in appointing the members of this council.
3-
The appointment of the head
of the court of cassation, the prosecutor, the magistrates, and their
mobility and authorization in all cases must be in accordance with
regulatory rules set out by the council.
4-
The discipline and trials
of judges should be the function of the Supreme Judicial Council under
appropriate measures which ensure fair trial in accordance with the
applicable standards. The resolutions issued on the disciplinary
procedures or the suspension procedures should be revisable on the part
of an independent judicial agency. The Judicial Inspection department
should be affiliate to the Supreme Judiciary Council.
5-
To transfer the authority
of setting a regulation, the judicial inspection department, submitting
the disciplinary appeal, and confirming the execution of the penalty on
the judge from the judge to the Supreme Judiciary Council.
6-
To set provisions regarding
the function of the general assemblies to distribute work – and banning
the authorization of the general assemblies for the heads of courts in
this regard.
7-
To incorporate within this
law the regulatory provisions of the Egyptian Judges Council in a way
that ensures the judges' right – individuals or in societies or
organizations – to practice their freedom of opinion and expression in
accordance with the traditions and norms of the judiciary.
8-
Reviewing the legislations
pertaining to the judges' immunities and to enlarge the penalties in
relation to the assaults on judges.
9-
Enlarging the criminal and
disciplinary penalties regarding the prevention of executing the
judicial provisions especially by the public employees. |
